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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JANE B. CARTER, also known as 
Mrs. J. W. Carter, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE S. SPENCER, GEORGE J. 
CANNON, LAURENCE E. ELLI-
SON, JAMES E. ELLISON, MOR-
RIS H. ELLISON, J. WM. KNIGHT, 
ELLISON RANCHING COMP A-
NY, a Utah corporation and ELLI-
SON RANCHING COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8249 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issue in this case is not complex, it is simply this: 
Can a dissenting stockholder be forced by a rna jority of the 
stockholders to surrender his stock in a corporation and accept 
in lieu thereof stock in another corporation? 
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Counsel for the appellants in their Brief set forth the 
facts as they contended them to be, not as the evidence estab-
lished them, and as the Court found them to be. It is uncon· 
troverted that the Ellison Ranching Company, a Utah cor-
poration, had been operating for many years and in May of 
1952 was a solvent, in fact a very successful corporation. On 
May 19th a notice of a meeting was sent out to the stock. 
holders which meeting, it was announced, was for the purpose 
of disincorporating in Utah and transferring the assets of the 
corporation to a Nevada corporation to be thereafter formed. 
The notice states that a copy of the proposed Articles of the 
Nevada corporation was attached thereto. However, it is ad-
mitted by all parties that these proposed Articles were not 
attached, and in fact were never seen by the plaintiff herein 
or by her proxy until the meeting of May 29th was nearing 
its conclusion (T-62). The meeting in question was held and 
the evidence among the parties differs considerably as to what 
actually transpired at this meeting. The Court having heard 
all of this evidence found in accordance with the claims of 
the plaintiff and entered its Findings of Fact accordingly. The 
court found in effect that the minutes as written up by Mr. 
Morris Ellison subsequent to the meeting did not accurately 
reflect what actually took place. What actually took place, 
and in . accordance with the Court's findings was in substance 
as follows: 
A Motion was first presented approving the operation of 
tJ::te Ellison Ranching Company, a Utah corporation, and com-
mending the officers thereof. This Motion was unanimously 
passed with Mr. Carter, the proxy for the plaintiff, voting for 
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such Motion. A second Motion was then presented calling 
for the dissolution of the Utah corporation. This Motion was 
also passed unanimously. A third Resolution was then pre-
sented which called for the incorporating of a Nevada cor-
poration, also to be known as the Ellison Ranching Company 
according to the proposed Articles of Incorporation which were 
then, for the first time, read to the stockholders. When this 
matter was put to a vote, Mr. Carter registered objection to 
the proposal and stated that he could not vote therefor. He 
is recorded as not voting. 
The Court could not have found otherwise in light of the 
evidence in the record. Mr. Ellison was faced with the fact that 
he had written a letter to the plaintiff (See Exhibit No. 2) in 
which he acknowledged to the plaintiff that her proxy, had 
objected to the Nevada corporation and to accepting stock 
in the Nevada corporation in lieu of her stock in the Utah 
corporation and had in fact threatened to employ an attorney 
to prevent such action. Mr. Ellison attempted to explain this 
away on the ground that these objections were made im-
mediately after the meeting adjourned in the presence of 
only himself and his brother and not in the meeting itself. 
This contention is refuted by the fact that Mr. Smoot, one 
of the directors, admitted on cross-examination to having heard 
these objections and the evidence shows that Mr. Smoot was 
not present at any conference after the meeting and so could 
have heard them only at the meeting. Furthermore, Mr. Elli-
son himself, on cross-examination, admitted that at the time 
the resolution which he designated No. 1 Resolution approving 
the incorporation of the Nevada corporation was adopted, the 
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stockholders had not even heard the proposed Articles of In-
corporation read (T-62). Under his theory they were in effect 
buying a tcpig in a poke." This, of course, is inconceivable. 
The only sensible finding is as the Court di~ find, namely, to 
the effect that the Resolution providing for the incorporation 
of the Nevada corporation and the transfer thereto of the 
assets of the Utah corporation was Resolution No. 3 to which 
Mr. Carter voiced his objections. The evidence in regard to 
these matters will be discussed more in detail in connection 
with the points to which applicable. 
POINT ONE 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSENT TO THE SO-
CALLED ((REORGANIZATION" AND CANNOT BE 
FORCED TO ACCEPT STOCK IN THE NEW CORPORA-
TION IN LIEU OF HER STOCK IN THE OLD CORPORA-
TION. 
The defendants have changed their position during the 
course of this case. When the Complaint was first filed, they 
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by a 2/3 vote 
the majority stockholders could force the so-called reorgani-
zation and compel a dissenting minority stockholder to accept 
stock in the new corporation in lieu of her stock in the dis-
solved corporation. This matter was thoroughly argued before 
Judge Baker and the Motion to Dismiss was denied. The de-
fendants have apparently abandoned this position at the pres-
ent time, however, because it is the crux of this case, it requires 
some comment here. 
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There are three general statutory methods by which the 
character of corporations can be changed. However, in each 
case the statute must be followed closely and in the absence 
of statute, the power does not exist except by unanimous con-
sent. These methods are consolidation, merger and reorgani-
zation. Although these three processes have some elements in 
common, they are by no means the same procedure. Under 
a consolidation one corporation is absorbed into and becomes 
part of another corporation. Under a merger, two corporations 
enter together to form a single new corporation. Under a 
reorganization one corporation goes out of existence and a 
new corporation takes over its property. Any of these pro-
cedures can be followed by unanimous consent of all stock-
holders. However, unless there is statutory authority therefor, 
none of them may be followed without unanimous consent. 
Utah has a statute on consolidation and merger but none on 
reorganization. In Idaho the same situation prevails. In the 
case of Whicher v. Delaware Mines Corporation, decided by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in 1932, 15 Pac. (2d) 610, a cor-
poration attempted to affect a reorganization by virtue of the 
consolidation and merger statute just as was done in this case. 
In holding that this could not be done, the Idaho Supreme 
Court stated: 
((No specific statutory authority for the reorganiza-
tion of a corporation is contained in the laws of Idaho, 
either in the) Business Corporation Act of 1929 or else-
where. The Business Corporation Act does make pro-
vision for the merger and consolidation of corpora-
tions (Sess. Laws 1929, c. 262, Sec. 38-43), which 
carry some of the attributes of a reorganization. We 
are concerned here, however, with an attempted volun-
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tary reorganization of the Delaware Company similar 
to that proposed in Seymour v. Boise Railroad Com-
pany, Ltd., supra, which can be accomplished, absent 
statutory authority, only upon the consent and agree-
ment of all the stockholders. 
~'But where there has beeri no judicial sale of the 
property, a reorganization can be accomplished by the 
stockholders only upon the consent and agreement of 
all, unless there is some statutory provision or an agree-
ment by which the stockholders either not consenting 
or not consulted shall be protected." 8 Thompson on 
Corporations ( 3rd Ed.) p. 41, Sec. 5988. 
~'There can be no question as to the right of stock-
holders to reorganize their corporation, but this right 
is subject to this well-defined rule that a part of the 
stockholders, even a majority cannot reorganize and 
deprive nonconsenting stockholders of their property 
or change their contract rights, without their consent. 
A stockholder has a vested interest in the corporate 
property and earnings, represented by his shares of 
stock, of which he cannot be deprived, in the absence 
of a delinquency which justifies and authorizes for-
feiture. 14 C. ]. 480, Sec. 707. The attributes which 
attach to a share of stock are well defined in Ken v. 
Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159: HThe holding 
and owning of a share gave a right which could not 
be divested without the assent of the holder and _owner; 
or unless the power so to do had been reserved in 
some way. (Mech. Bank v. N.Y. & N.H. R.R. Co., 
13 N.Y. 5 99-62 7.) Shares of stock are in the nature of 
choses in action, and give the holder a fixed right in 
the division of the profits or earnings of a company 
so long as it exists, and of its effects when it is dissolved. 
That right is as inviolable as is any right in property, 
and can no more be taken away or lessened, against 
the will of the owner than can any other right, unless 
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power is reserved in the first instance, when it enters 
into the constitution of the right; or is properly de-
rived afterwards from a superior law giver. The cer-
tificate of stock is the muniment of the shareholder's 
title, and evidence of his right. It expresses the con-
tract between the corporation and his co-stockholders 
and himself; and that contract cannot, he being un-
willing, be taken away from him or changed as to 
him without his prior dereliction, or under the con-
ditions above stated." 
In the Montana case Forrester et al v. Boston & M. Con-
solidated Copper and Silver Mining Co., et al, 55 Pac. 229, 
it was proposed that all assets of a Montana corporation be 
transferred to a New York corporation. Stockholders of the 
Montana corporation were to receive in exchange shares of 
stock in the New York corporation, except that dissenting 
stockholders were to receive $170.00 per share for their shares. 
The holders of 13,1,036 shares voted in favor of the reorgani-
zation. Holders of 200 shares dissented and brought an in-
junction suit to restrain the transfer. The Court held that the 
transfer was ultra vires without the unanimous consent of all 
the stockholders and granted the injunction. 
In the Arizona case of Farish et al v. Cieneguita Copper 
Co., 100 Pac. 781, the majority of the stockholders in the 
Arizona corporation formed a Nevada corporation and trans-
ferred all the assets to that corporation. Suit was brought to 
set aside the transfer. The Court refused to set aside the 
transfer because it did not have the jurisdiction of the N e-
vada corporation, but held that the transfer was ultra vires 
and that the reorganization could not be accomplished without 
the unanimous consent of all stockholders. 
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Another good case in point is the New York case of Peo-
ple v. Ballard, 32 N.E. 54, where the· Court stated: 
. ((W'"hile a corporation may sell its property to pay 
1ts debts or to carry on its business, it cannot sell its 
property in order to deprive itself of existence. It 
cannot sell all its property to a foreign corporation 
organized through its procurement when a majority 
of non-resident trustees for · the express purpose of 
stepping into its shoes, taking all its assets and carry-
ing on its business. That would be the practical de-
struction of the corporation by its own act which the 
law will not tolerate. Whether the process by which 
it was sought to convert the New York corporation 
into a California corporation is called ~~reorganiza­
tion" or H amalgamation" it was the exercise of a 
power not delegated and was void. It was a corporate 
burial in New York for resurrection in California. 
While the stockholders who consented may be estopped 
by their acts, those who do not consent can take ad-
vantage of this violation of their rights and the state 
of New York can demand that those who did the 
wrong shall make. restitution. 
((The fact that the trustees acted in good faith did 
not empower them to do an illegal act, and the fact 
that there may be some difficulty in the final adjust-
m.ent of rights because some of the stockholders con-
sented while others did not, constitutes no defense 
to the action." 
See also in support of this position Moore v. Los Lugos Gold 
Mine et al, 21 Pac. ( 2d) 2 53; also 15 Fletcher on Corporations 
325. 
The defendants, as stated above, have now apparently 
abandoned the position that 2/3 of the stockholders could force 
10 
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Mrs. Carter into the new corporation and have taken the po-
sition that Mrs. Carter, through her proxy, consented to accept 
stock in the Nevada corporation. As has been pointed out 
above, the evidence is quite to the contrary. Mr. Carter, the 
plaintiff's son, kept the only minutes of the corporate meeting. 
He referred to three Resolutions that were acted upon as 
Resolutions 1, 3 and 3, but his notes did not set out the nature 
of these three Resolutions. Mr. Morris Ellison, who wrote 
up the minutes himself some time later with the aid of Mr. 
Carter's notes, showed Resolution No. 1 as being a Resolu-
tion authorizing the dissolution of the Utah corporation and 
the organization of the Nevada corporation. Resolution No. 
2 he showed as a Resolution authorizing the use of the name 
Ellison Ranching Company by the Nevada corporation. Reso-
lution No. 3 he showed as a Resolution approving the Articles 
of Incorporation for the new Nevada corporation. 
Mr. Carter, on the other hand, testified that Resolution 
No. 1 was a Resolution commending the officers of the old cor-
poration for their conduct of the business. Resolution No. 2 
was a Resolution dissolving the Utah corporation and Reso-
lution No. 3 was a Resolution to form the Nevada corporation 
and accepting the Articles of Incorporation therefor. As has 
been pointed out above, after hearing all of the evidence, the 
Cou1t held with the testimony of Mr. Carter. This is an im-
portant matter in the case because Mr. Carter voted for Reso-
lutions No. 1 and 2, but refrained from voting for Resolution 
No. 3 and at the same time indicated his vigorous objection 
thereto. 
The evidence strongly supports the facts as found by the 
11 
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Court. Mr. Ellison himself admitted (Tr. 62) that at the time 
Resolution No. 1, whatever it might have been, was adopted 
the stockholders had never heard the proposed Articles of the 
new corporation. He admits that they were not read to the 
stockholders until Resolution No. 3 was under consideration. 
It does not appear probable that the stockholders would vote 
to form the Nevada corporation until they knew what the 
Articles of that corporation were to provide. Furthermore, 
let us take for a moment the position that Resolution No. 1 
did authorize the dissolution of the Utah corporation and the 
formation of the Nevada corporation. Could that then bind 
all of the stockholders who had voted for it to accept what-
ever Articles of Incorporaton might be set up for the Nevada 
corporation? Certainly no dissenting stockholders would be 
bound to accept the stock in this new corporation until the 
character of the Articles were made known and approved by 
all stockholders. Even the defendants admit that Mrs. Carter's 
proxy did not vote to approve the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Nevada corporation. 
There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether Mr. Carter, 
as his Mother's proxy, merely refrained from voting or vigor-
ously urged his objections. The Court found that he did urge 
his objections in the stockholders meeting. Mr. Ellison, when 
confronted with plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, a letter which he 
wrote to the plaintiff on November 27, 1952, maintained that 
these objections of Mr. Carter were voiced not at the meet-
ing; but immediate! y thereafter. This letter in question stated: 
nEarly last summer your son represented you at our 
shareholders' meeting and he seemed very much ex-
12 
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ercised over the fact that we had made the decision 
to disincorporate in Utah and to organize under the 
laws of Nevada and felt that we had no right to 
take such action without your consent. He informed 
us that he would consult an attorney in the matter. 
* * * * * The new company has taken over all the 
assets of the old one and your old certificate is there-
fore of no value to you. If and when you send in the 
old certificate, we will send the new one to you and 
will also send you the dividend check.'' 
One of the directors of the company, however, Mr. Smoot, ad-
mitted that he had heard Mr. Carter's objection (Tr. 35). Mr. 
Smoot was present only at the regular meeting and not at 
any conference held thereafter, and therefore, could not have 
heard the objections only during the meeting. The findings are 
clear, therefore, and supported by irrefutable evidence that 
Mrs. Carter's proxy objected vigorously at the stockholders' 
meeting to accepting stock in the Nevada corporation in lieu 
of her stock in the Utah corporation. 
The evidence is also clear that the officers and directors 
of the Utah corporation believing that they required only a 
2/3 vote (see Morris Ellison Transcript, page 32), proceeded 
to transfer the assets without making any provision whatever 
to compensate Mrs. Carter for her share of such assets. 
POINT TWO 
THE DIRECTORS ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR 
BREACH OF TRUST. 
Defendants' counsel take the position in their Brief that 
the directors are not personally liable because it was the 
13 
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President and Secretary that actually signed the papers effect-
ing transfer of the assets of the Utah corporation to the Ne-
vada corporation. This contention if it were valid would, of 
course, not be available to Mr. Morris Ellison, one of the 
defendants against whom judgment was rendered as he was 
President as well as Director. However, an examination of 
this position will reveal that the position is not sound as to 
any of the defendants. All of the cases cited under this section 
by the defendants are to the effect that there is no personal 
liability on the part of the directors if they act pursuant to 
a valid resolution of the stockholders. However, it is equally 
clear, as. cases we will cite will show, that an invalid or ultra 
vires action by the stockholders is no protection to the Board 
of Directors and the Board of Directors are personally liable 
to any dissenting stockholders injured by their action pursuant 
to such ultra vires resolution. 
In regard to the claim that the Board of Directors did 
nothing in this case for which they could be liable, we wish 
to call attention of the Court to the fact that the directors 
are charged with the operation of the corporate business. The 
directors against whom judgment was entered in this case 
were all directors of the Utah corporation which transferred 
the assets to the Nevada corporation. They all became directors 
of the Nevada corporation which accepted the assets from the 
Utah corporation. To say that they had nothing to do with 
the transaction is ridiculous. Whether they were all present 
at all itmes, of course, is immaterial. As directors they are made 
responsible individually for the action taken by the Board 
of Directors as a whole. 
14 
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In this regard, Sections 16-2-28, 16-2-29 and 16-2-30, 
U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
n 16-2-28. Directors charged with knowledge of cor-
porate affairs.-Every director of a corporation is 
deemed to possess such a knowledge of the affairs of 
his corporation as to enable him to determine whether 
any act, proceeding or omission of the board is a vio-
lation of law. 
n 16-2-29. Directors persumed to have concurred in 
corporate acts, unless expressly dissenting. Every direc-
tor of a corporation who is present at a meeting of 
the board at which any act, proceeding or omission 
of such directors in violation of law occurs is deemed 
to have concurred therein, unless he at the time causes, 
or in writing requires, his dissent therefrom to be 
entered in the minutes of the directors. 
n 16-2-30. Absent directors presumed to have con-
curred in corporate acts.-Every director of a corpor-
ation although not present at a meeting of the directors 
at which any act, ·proceeding or omission of such di-
rectors in violation of law occurs is deemed to have 
concurred therein, if the facts constituting such vio-
lation appear on the records or minutes of the pro-
ceedings of the board of directors and he remains a 
director of the same corporation for six months there-
after and does not within that time cause, or in writing 
require, his dissent from such act, proceeding or omis-
sion to be entered in the minutes of the directors." 
Directors of a corporation are in a fiduciary capacity, 
and are responsible to the stockholders for any breach of that 
fiduciary relationship. The following general language in this 
regard is found at 13, Am. Jur. 939. 
((The posts of director and executive officers of cor-
porations carry with them certain duties attendant upon 
15 
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the management of the affairs of the corporation and 
the custody and use of its assets. The directors and 
officers of a corporation in charge of its management 
are, in the performance of their official duties, under 
obligations of trust and confidence to the corporation 
or its stockholders and must act in good faith and for 
the interests of the corporation or its stockholders, 
with- due care and diligence, and within the scope 
of their authority. Any intentional deviation or de-
parture from these duties to the substantial in jury 
of any of the stockholders constitutes wilful mis-
management as a matter of law, for which a court of 
equity has jurisdiction to call them to account; and 
where the directors or officers of a corporation are 
guilty of a breach or neglect of any duties owing by 
them to the corporation, and the proximate result 
of such breach or neglect of duty is a loss to the cor-
poration, they are liable to it." 
In - regard to personal liability of the directors of the 
corporation for selling assets of the corporation without proper 
authority, the following language_ is found at 3 Fletcher on 
Corporatoins, page 168, paragraph 1107: 
etA sale without authority makes the officer who 
made the sale personally liable. Thus the directors are 
personally liable to the corporation for a diversion 
where they wrongfully transferred all its assets to a 
consolidated corporation.'' 
The same matter was presented to the Connecticut Supreme 
Court in the case of Mills v. Tiffany, Inc., 198 Atl. 185. There 
the Supreme Court stated: 
nDirectors or stockholders who brought about an 
illegal transfer are guilty of a to·rt and may be held 
personally accountable for the loss suffered by the 
minority stockholder. Nave-McChord Mercantile Com-
16 
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pany v. Ranney, supra, 8 CIR, 29 Fed. (2d) 383-389; 
Irvin v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., CC 20 
Fed. 577-582; Heath v. Erie Railway Co. 8 Blatchf. 
347-394, Fed. Case 6:·06; Godley v. Crandall and 
Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N.Y. Supp. 236-
249, affirmed me as to this point. 212 N.Y. 121, 105 
N.E. 818, L.R.A. 1915-D 632. The nature of the wrong 
being one ex delicto, any person who actively and 
knowingly participated in bring it about may be held 
equally liable with the guilty directors or stockholders." 
For further holdings to the same effect, see the following 
cases: Oil Shore v. Kahn, 94 Fed. ( 2d) 751; Spiegel v. Beacon 
Participation, a Mass. case, 8 N.E .. (2d) 895; Hornstein v. 
Paramount Pictures, 37 N.Y. Supp (2d) 404. 
The corporate directc5rs in this case have breached their 
trust by having conveyed all of the corporate property away 
without proper authority and are personally liable to the plain-
tiff as a dissenting stockholder. Even under the defendants' 
theory that the directors did nothing toward the corporate 
transfer, still the holding would be good as to Morris Ellison, 
who was both President and Director. 
POINT THREE 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR 
THE VALUE OF HER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE 
ASSETS OF THE CORPORATION LESS THE LIABILITIES 
OF THE CORPORATION. 
The defendants take the position that the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover the market value of her stock as such if sold 
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on the open market, and not her representative share of the 
assets. This position is not well taken for three reasons: 
1. The defendants stipulated to the type of appraisal 
adopted by the Court. 
2 .We do not have here a conversion of the stock itself 
as the plaintiff still has her stock. What they converted was the 
assets out from under the stock. 
3. This' would be the proper method of evaluation even 
if the stock itself had been converted. 
During the course of the trial, the Court called counsel 
into its chamqers and discussed the method of making an ap-
praisal. The court pointed out that it would be best to have 
the job done by experts. An agreement was reached in chambers 
which was later quoted in the record and which agreement 
appears at page 10 of the defendants' Brief to the effect that 
three appraisers would be appointed who would value the 
assets of the Utah corporation; that the Court should then 
deduct the liabilities and determine the proportionate share 
that belonged to the plaintiff depending on her holdings of 
stock. This method of appraisal was agreed upon by counsel 
and by the parties in open court. More will be said of this 
particular matter in the succeeding section. 
In this case we do not have a conversion of the stock itself. 
There' was a valid resolution adopted for the dissolution of 
the Utah corporation. All stockholders voted for that and 
indeed if the plaintiff had dissented from such a vote, it 
would have done no good because 2/3rds of the stockhold-
ers, under the Utah law, may direct a dissolution. However, 
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when a dissolution is made the directors become trustees for 
the stockholders, either to distribute the assets in kind or to 
sell the assets and to distribute the proceeds therefrom among 
the stockholders according to their share holdings. The di-
rectors, therefore, had power to take the property from the 
corporation, but they had no power in the absence of the 
plaintiff to place her share of the property into a new cor-
poration. It was, therefore, the plaintiff's share of the assets 
of the corporation rather than the stock itself which was con-
verted. 
Even if it were held to be the stock of the corporation 
which was converted, still the measure of damages adopted 
is the proper one. In case of a closely held corporation where 
there is no active market for the stock, the only method of 
determining valuation is to determine the cash value of the 
assets back of the stock. In those states which have statutory 
provisions authorizing reorganization on less than a unanimous 
vote of the stockholders, such statutory provisions almost with-
out exception provide that the corporation must purchase the 
stock of the dissenting shareholders. Fletcher on Corporations, 
Vol. 15, page 245, discusses the matter of the measure of 
value of stock purchased under such reorganization statutes. 
The authors of this work state: 
((The courts must determine the value of the shares 
of dissenting stockholders and in arriving at such 
valuation all the assets and liabilities of the corpora-
tion must be ascertained and considered such as the 
company's good will. In other words the appraisal 
of the stock should embrace the elements entering into 
its value." 
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POINT FOUR 
THE APPRAISERS MADE A LEGAL AND SOUND 
APPRAISAL. 
Counsel has never been able to understand the objection 
which the defendants have to the appraisal as returned, ex-
cept that they think it is too high. There were three qualified 
appraisers appointed, Mr. Leonard Elton, a well-known and 
respected member of the Utah Bar; Mr. Karl Hardy, whom 
couns~l has never met, but whom he understands is a qualified 
real estate man, and Mr. Don Kinney, a livestock man who 
is an employee of a company of which Mr. Morris Ellison is 
a director. At least .two of these men actually made a trip 
to the ranches and conferred with the Ellisons' employees 
before arriving at a figure. 
Much. of the property was in the form of stocks, bonds 
and cash on which it was easy to determine the value. The live-
stock was appraised on the ranch. The appraisers arrived at 
this valuation by taking the market value less the cost of 
gathering the livestock and getting it to the market. In re-
gard to the real property, where the defendants seem to have 
the most objection, the appraisers determined that tl)e cash 
value on real property of this type depended upon its carrying 
capacity. This carrying capacity, of course, takes into considera-
tion the number of acres, the amount of water available, the 
amount of grass available and all other features that go into 
enabling the ranch to raise cattle. The appraisers, after con-
ferences with the Ellison people, determined what the carrying 
capacity of the ranch was. They then determined the price 
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that ranches would bring on the open market depending upon 
carrying capacity and thus arrived at the valuation. This ap-
pears to be clearly within the direction given by the Court to 
the appraisers, and certainly appears to be a good sound method 
for an expert appraiser to arrive at a valuation of property 
of this type. 
Counsel for the defendants makes much of the fact that 
plaintiff filed her Motion for Judgment before the appraisal 
was actually filed in the Court. The reason for this was ex-
plained by counsel for the plaintiff in the record. Mr. Leonard 
Elton, one of the appraisers, called counsel for the plaintiff 
and informed him that the appraisal was completed. He further 
informed him that in view of the fact that the appraisers 
had been contacted during the course of the appraisal by 
Mr. Skeen, attorney for the defendants, Mr. Elton felt that 
counsel for the plaintiff should look over the appraisal before 
it was filed. Counsel proceeded to do so and made no objection 
thereto except to call to the attention of the appraisers that 
the number of shares of Utah Power and Light stock had 
been understated due to a typographical error. Counsel for 
the plaintiff was then informed by Mr. Elton that the appraisal 
was being returned with the correction. Counsel then proceeded 
to file a Motion unaware that Mr. Elton had been delayed 
in the technicality of getting the signatures upon the appraisal 
which had been agreed to by all three appraisers. 
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POINT FIVE 
THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED 
TO APPEAL THIS JUDGMENT AS IT IS IN EFFECT A 
CONSENT JUDGMENT. 
As pointed out above, during the course of the trial, a 
conference was held in the Judge's chambers. The matter was 
discussed pro and con, and it was agreed by all parties that 
the appraisers should determine the fair value of the assets 
of the corporation; that the Judge should then deduct there-
from the liabilities of the corporation and that the defendants 
should then pay to the plaintiff the value of her proportionate 
share of the assets less liabilities. This stipulation was read 
into the record by the Court and all parties agreed thereto. 
The defendants evidently felt that because one of the ap-
praisers was an employee of a company of which Mr. Morris 
Ellison was a director that they would be able to direct the 
course of the appraisal. As quickly as they found that they 
had underestimated the independence of Mr. Kinney, they 
started to backtrack on the stipulation. However, the stipu-
lation still stands and is subject to no other interpretation than 
that defendants consented that a judgment be returned accord-
ing to the formula agreed upon. Plaintiff, therefore, submits 
that the defendants have no standing before this Court. Any 
error in the Court's proceeding, if error there was before the 
stipulation, would be wiped out thereby. The defendants were 
not pressured by anybody to enter into the stipulation. They 
did it willingly. Now that they have not gained the advantage 
that they hoped to gain thereby, they are attempting to change 
their position. 
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POINT SIX 
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT NO AMOUNT 
SHOULD BE DEDUCTED FROM THE VALUE OF THE 
ASSETS FOR ANY CORPORATE INCOME TAX PAY-
ABLE UNDER A SUPPOSED SALE. 
After the appraisal was returned, counsel for the plaintiff 
made a motion for judgment against the defendants. The 
amount stated in this motion was arrived at as follows: Coun-
sel first took the total value of the assets as found by the ap-
praiser and then deducted therefrom the company's liabilities 
as shown by the Answers to Interrogatories filed by the Com-
pany president during the course of the case. The value per 
share of stock outstanding was then determined by dividing 
the result of this figure by the total shares outstanding. The 
amount due to the plaintiff was then determined by multiplying 
the number of shares which she held by the value per share 
of the stock. The defendants objected to the figure thus arrived 
at, contending that the company had certain liabilities that 
had not been listed. The Court heard the evidence on this 
point and made an adjustment in the figure to allow for these 
other liabilities. The Court, however, refused to allow a de-
duction of some $400,000.00 which the defendants claim 
would have been due to the Federal Government in income 
tax, if in fact, the property had been sold. They based their 
computation on the theory that the corporation itself would 
sell the property in the ordinary course of business. This 
matter was thoroughly briefed for the Trial Court and the 
defendants cited the same cases that they had cited in their 
brief to this Court. Each of these cases which hold the sale 
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taxable to the corporation do so on a particular fact situation. 
The case which goes the farthest of any of them is the Court 
Holding Company case. There the Supreme Court held that 
the sale was made by the corporation, however, the facts were 
that the sale was negotiated by the corporation and in fact 
the original down payment was paid to the corporation. 
The language in the Court Holding Company case was 
rather broad and it caused some uncertainty in the law with the 
result that the Supreme Court in the later case of United States 
v. Cumberland Public Service Company, 338 U.S. 451; 94 
L. Ed. 2 51, granted certiorari. The language used by the Court 
in the later case explains its holding in the Court Holding 
Company case and also definitely establishes the law; there-
fore, we take the liberty of quoting at some length from this 
decision: 
( ( ... One judge dissented, believing that our opinion 
in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 
89 L Ed 981, 65 S Ct. 707, required a finding that 
the sale had been made by the corporation. Certiorari 
was granted, 338 U.S. 846, to clear up doubts arising 
out of the Court Holding Co. case. 
tcOur Court Holding Co. decision rested on findings 
of fact by the Tax Court that a sale had been made and 
gains realized by the tax payer corporation. There the 
corporation had negotiated for sale of its assets and 
had reached an oral agreement of sale. When the tax 
consequences of the corporate sale were belately rec-
ognized, the corporation purported to (call off' the 
sale at the last minute and distributed the physical 
properties in kind to the stockholders. They promptly 
conveyed these properties to the same persons who had 
negotiated with the corporation. The terms of purchase 
were substantially those of the previous oral agreement. 
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One thousand dollars already paid to the corporation 
was applied as part payment of the purchase price. 
The Tax Court found that the corporation never really 
abandoned its sale negotiations, that it never did dis-
solve, and that the sale purpose of the so-called liqui-
dation was to disguise a corporate sale through use 
of mere formalisms in order to avoid tax liability. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view of 
the evidence. In this Court the Government contended 
that whether a liquidation distribution was genuine 
or merely a sham was traditionally a question of fact. 
We agreed with this contention, and reinstated the 
Tax Court's findings and judgment. Discussing the 
evidence which supported the findings of fact, we 
went on to say that tthe incidence of taxation depends 
upon the substance of a transaction' regardless of 
(mere formalisms', and that taxes on a corporate sale 
cannot be avoided by using the shareholders as a (con-
duit through which to pass title.' 
((This language does not mean that a corporation 
can be taxed even when the sale has been made by its 
stockholders following a genuine liquidation and dis-
solution. While the distinction between sales by a 
corporation as compared with distribution in kind 
followed by shareholder sales may be particularly 
shadowy and artificial when the corporation is closely 
held, Congress has chosen to recognize such a distinc-
tion for tax purposes. The corporate tax is thus aitned 
primarily at the profits of a going concern. This is true 
despite the fact that gains realized from corporate 
sales are taxes, perhaps to prevent tax evasions, even 
where the cash proceeds are at once distributed in 
liquidation. But Congress has imposed no tax on liqui-
dating distributions in kind or on dissolution, what-
ever may be the motive for such liquidation. Conse-
quently, a corporation may liquidate, or dissolve 
without subjecting itself to the corporate gains tax, 
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even though a primary motive is to a void the burden 
of corporate taxation. 
C(Here, on the basis of adequate subsidiary findings, 
the Court of Claims has found that the sale in ques-
tion was made by the stockholders rather than the 
corporation. The Government's argument that the 
shareholders acted as a mere (conduit' for a sale by 
respondent corporation muts fall before this finding. 
The subsidiary finding that a major motive of the 
shareholders was to reduce taxes does not bar this con-
clusion. Whatever the motive and however relevant 
it may be in determining whether the transaction was 
real or a sham, sales of physical properties by share-
holders. following a genuine liquidation distribution 
cannot be attributed to the corporation for tax pur-
poses." 
Mr. Lynn E. Baxter, a tax expert called by the defendants, 
admitted on cross-examination ( T -104) that there would be 
no tax payable on dissolution if the sale were made by the 
directors as trustees for the stockholders. 
It appears clear, therefore, that no tax would have been 
assessable to the corporation on a sale and distribution by the 
stockholders and so the Court properly refused to deduct this 
amount from the valuation of the assets. The Court then en-
tered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount the Court 
found as adjusted, together with interest from the date of 
converston. 
It is a well-established rule of law that in converston 
cases, interest is allowable at the legal rate from the date of 
conversion to the date of judgment. The defendants contested 
this matter in the court below but do not contest it here. We, 
therefore, are citing no cases in support of this proposition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem before the Court is simply this. Can the ma-
jority of stockholders compel a minority and dissenting stock-
holder to surrender her stock in the corporation in exchange 
for shares of stock in another corporation? It appears that it 
would clearly be unjust and unequitable to take away this 
property right of the shareholder in a corporation. The appeal 
should, therefore, be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PlJGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
rtnd Respondent 
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